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 In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision declaring 
unconstitutional the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 
which barred most states from legalizing sports wagering, many states have 
legalized intrastate sports betting. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has considered 
an expanded regulatory role for the federal government. A healthy debate has 
emerged regarding whether individual states should have the power to regulate 
sports betting within their respective states or whether federal oversight is 
needed.  
This article argues against the latter position, while leaving untouched the 
separate issue of whether sports gambling (or gambling, more generally) should 
be regulated at all. For purposes of this article, the author operates under the 
assumption that sports gambling should be regulated and, thus, addresses only 
the issue of whether such regulation should be by the federal government or the 
individual states.  
Part I very briefly provides relevant background on PASPA and New 
Jersey’s challenge to the law. Part II very briefly discusses the aftermath of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on PASPA, including various states’ legalizing sports 
betting within their respective states and the introduction of a bill calling for 
federal regulation of the sports-betting industry in the U.S. Part III lays out the 
author’s argument against additional federal involvement, arguing that the 




The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (hereafter “PASPA”)1 
was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1992. 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Stephen F. Austin State University, 
Nacogdoches, Texas. B.A., The University of Alabama. J.D., Harvard Law School. 
1  28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2018). PASPA is also known as the Bradley Act. 
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Enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, PASPA 
generally outlawed sports betting in the U.S. As explained by the Supreme Court 
of the United States (hereafter “SCOTUS”),  
 
[The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA)]… makes it unlawful for a State or its subdivisions “to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law 
or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, 
or wagering scheme based . . . on” competitive sporting events, 
28 U. S. C. §3702(1)… [and] for “a person to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, or promote” those same gambling schemes… if done 
“pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity,” 
§3702(2). [But] PASPA does not make sports gambling [itself] a 
federal crime. Instead, PASPA allows the Attorney General, as 
well as professional and amateur sports organizations, to bring 
civil actions to enjoin violations. §3703… “Grandfather” 
provisions allow existing forms of sports gambling to continue, 
§3704(a)(1)–(2), [and] another provision would have permitted 
New Jersey to set up a sports gambling scheme in Atlantic City… 
within a year of PASPA’s enactment, § 3704(a)(3).2  
 
New Jersey failed to enact sports betting within the one-year window, but in 
2011, New Jersey voters approved a state-constitutional amendment that 
permitted the New Jersey Legislature to legalize sports gambling.3 The New 
Jersey Legislature did so in 20124, and Governor Chris Christie signed the law. 
Subsequently, the law was challenged in federal court by the NCAA and the four 
major professional sports leagues5, which sought an injunction against the law 
on the grounds that it violated PASPA. In response, New Jersey claimed PASPA 
violated the U.S. Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, Commerce Clause, Due 
Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Equal Footing Doctrine.6 In ruling 
for the plaintiffs, the trial court rejected each of New Jersey’s positions, writing, 
“The Court has determined that PASPA is constitutional, and due to the operation 
of the Supremacy Clause, New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law is preempted.”7 
The Third Circuit affirmed, stating, “Having examined the difficult legal issues 
raised by the parties, we hold that nothing in PASPA violates the U.S. 
Constitution. The law neither exceeds Congress' enumerated powers nor violates 
any principle of federalism implicit in the Tenth Amendment or anywhere else 
 
2  Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1469 (2018). 
3  Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014).  
4  Id. 
5  Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J. 2013). 
The National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
Major League Baseball (MLB), and the National Hockey League (NHL). 
6  Id. at 554. 
7  Id. at 577. 
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in our Constitutional structure.”8 SCOTUS then denied New Jersey’s petition for 
certiorari.9 
 In 2014, New Jersey passed another law10, which repealed any New Jersey 
state laws prohibiting sports gambling in the state. Just three days later, the 
plaintiffs from the earlier Christie lawsuit (the major professional sports leagues) 
again filed suit in federal court, alleging New Jersey’s new law violated PASPA 
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.11 Once again, the defendants 
challenged the constitutionality of PASPA.12 As was the case with the earlier 
Christie case, the plaintiffs prevailed at trial, as the court ruled that New Jersey’s 
2014 law, “by allowing some, but not all, types of sports wagering in New Jersey, 
thus creating a label of legitimacy for sports wagering pursuant to a state 
scheme”13, was preempted by PASPA. Once again, the Third Circuit affirmed, 
stating, “We will not allow Appellants to bootstrap already decided questions of 
PASPA's constitutionality onto our determination that the 2014 Law violates 
PASPA. We reject the notion that PASPA presents states with a coercive binary 
 
8  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 240 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
9  Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 573 U.S. 931 (2014).  
10  See N. J. Laws, P.L. 2014, Chapter 62, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/ 
PL14/062_.HTM. The bill summary contains the following statement: “This bill 
implements the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of N.J., 
730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), wherein the court in interpreting the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq., 
stated that it does “not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban 
on sports wagering.”  National Collegiate Athletic Association, 730 F.3d at 
232.  The court further stated that “it is left up to each state to decide how much 
of a law enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or what the 
 exact contours of the prohibition will be.”  Id. at 233 (emphasis added).   
Moreover, the United States in its brief submitted to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in opposition to petitions for writs of certiorari in the above-
referenced case wrote that “PASPA does not even obligate New Jersey to leave 
in place the state-law prohibitions against sports gambling that it had chosen to 
adopt prior to PASPA’s enactment.  To the contrary, New Jersey is free to repeal 
those prohibitions in whole or in part.”  United States Brief to the Supreme Court 
in Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari (Nos. 13-967, 13-979, 13-980), 
dated May 14, 2014, at 11 (emphasis added).” Id. As explained by SCOTUS, 
“Instead of affirmatively authorizing sports gambling schemes, this law repeals state-
law provisions that prohibited such schemes, insofar as they concerned wagering on 
sporting events by persons 21 years of age or older; at a horseracing track or a casino 
or gambling house in Atlantic City; and only as to wagers on sporting events not 
involving a New Jersey college team or a collegiate event taking place in the State.” 
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1469 (2018). 
11  Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490 (D.N.J. 2014). 
12  Id. at 498.  
13  Id. at 504. 
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choice or affirmative command and conclude, as we did in Christie I, that it does 
not unconstitutionally commandeer the states.”14 On June 27, 2017, SCOTUS 
granted New Jersey’s petition for certiorari. Finally, on May 14, 2018, SCOTUS 
struck down PASPA15, on the grounds that it violated the Tenth Amendment, 
since it contravened the Constitution’s anti-commandeering rule, in multiple 
ways.16 SCOTUS explained, 
 
[PASPA’s anti-authorization] provision unequivocally 
dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. [The 
distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation 
and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws] is empty… 
The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct 
orders to state legislatures—applies in either event..17… 
 
14  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
15  Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1461 (2018).  By this 
time, Phil Murphy was the Governor of New Jersey. Governor Murphy took office 
on January 16, 2018. 
16  Id. at 1478. The case’s syllabus explained the meaning of the Constitution’s anti-
commandeering rule as follows: “As the Tenth Amendment confirms, all legislative 
power not conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States. 
Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct orders to the 
governments of the States. The anticommandeering doctrine that emerged in New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
simply represents the recognition of this limitation. Thus, ‘Congress may not simply 
“commandeer the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to 
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”’ New York, supra, at 161. 
Adherence to the anticommandeering principle is important for several reasons, 
including, as significant here, that the rule serves as ‘one of the Constitution’s 
structural safeguards of liberty,’ Printz, supra, at 921, that the rule promotes political 
accountability, and that the rule prevents Congress from shifting the costs of 
regulation to the States.” Id. at 1465. 
17   Id. at 1478. The case’s syllabus states, “Contrary to the claim of respondents and 
the United States, this Court’s precedents do not show that PASPA’s anti-
authorization provision is constitutional. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U. S. 505; 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U. S. 141; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, distinguished....Nor 
does the anti-authorization provision constitute a valid preemption provision. To 
preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. It must represent the exercise of 
a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. And, since the Constitution 
“confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, 
supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private actors. There is no 
way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision can be understood as a regulation 
of private actors. It does not confer any federal rights on private actors interested in 
conducting sports gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private 
actors.” Id. at 1467.   
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PASPA’s provision prohibiting state “licens[ing]” of sports 
gambling schemes also violates the anticommandeering rule. 
It issues a direct order to the state legislature and suffers from 
the same defect as the prohibition of state authorization. 
Thus, this Court need not decide whether New Jersey’s 2014 




After the Supreme Court invalidated PASPA, a number of states (some even 
within one month) legalized some form of intrastate sports betting. In fact, some 
states passed such legislation before PASPA was invalidated.19 Many other states 
have followed suit. To date20, some form of sports gambling is legal (even if not 
yet operational) in Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Washington, D.C., and West Virginia. Additionally, such betting is legal at 
certain Native-American venues in New Mexico, thanks to a tribal-gaming 
compact.21 More states are headed toward legalization.22 Before long, legal 
sports betting will be the rule among the states, not the exception.  
 
18  Id. at 1467.  
19  See Matthew Kredell, One Year After PASPA Repeal, Sports Betting Legislation 
Appears in More Than 75% of US, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32440/sports-betting-legislation-after-paspa/ 
(“Delaware, Pennsylvania and Mississippi had passed legislation to legalize sports 
betting in previous years, and West Virginia anticipated the legal decision by passing 
a bill before it adjourned in March 2018.”). 
20  Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/ (last visited Sept. 26, 
2020).  
21  National Indian Gaming Commission, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, NAT’L 
INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, https://www.nigc.gov/general-counsel/indian-gaming-
regulatory-act (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (“The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was 
enacted by the United States Congress on October 17, 1988, to regulate the conduct 
of gaming on Indian Lands. IGRA establishes the National Indian Gaming 
Commission and the regulatory structure for Indian gaming in the United States. 
Public Law 100-497-Oct. 17, 1988 100th Congress Sec. 2701.”); Legal New Mexico 
Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS BETTING (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.legalsports 
betting.com/new-mexico/; See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 
102 Stat. 2467; See also John Holden, So How Exactly Is New Mexico Sports Betting 
Legal, And What Does It Mean In Other States?, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/24965/legality-of-sports-betting-in-new-
mexico/.   
22  See Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where 
Every State Stands, ESPN (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/ 
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As the list of states that have legalized sports betting has grown, so have 
some calls for federal regulation of the industry. Better uniform federal standards 
that apply to all states than a patchwork of state-by-state regulation without 
oversight by the federal government, as the argument goes. This position took 
federal-legislative form with the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, 
introduced December 19, 2018, by U.S. Senators Charles Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
and Charles Schumer (D-NY).23 Fundamentally, the now-dead Hatch-Schumer 
Act would have required states with legal sports betting to comply with federal 
rules established by the U.S. Department of Justice. A Senate Democrats press 
release explained and defended the bill, in part, as follows: 
 
“This bipartisan legislation would put in place world-class 
safety measures to protect consumers, preserve the integrity 
of sporting events, and ensure the propriety of the sports 
wagering market... “As a lifelong sports fan, I treasure the 
purity of the game, and after Murphy v. NCAA, I knew that 
Congress had an obligation to ensure that the integrity of the 
games we love was never compromised,” 
said Schumer. “That is why I believe the time is now to 
establish a strong national integrity standard for sports 
betting that will protect consumers and the games 
themselves from corruption...States historically have 
regulated other forms of gaming with little intervention by 
the federal government. But the interstate nature of most 
sports wagering and the thriving, transnational illegal market 
demand the attention of the federal government to establish 
consistent standards for sports wagering regulators and to 
provide law enforcement with additional authorities to target 
the illegal sports wagering market and bad actors in the 
growing legal market...”24 
 
Prior to introducing the bill, Senator Hatch wrote, 
“For the sake of the athletes, for the sake of the fans and for 
the sake of the game, Congress must act to protect the 
integrity of sports and guide states as they consider whether 
to embrace sports betting. To be clear, it will be up to each 




23  See Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).  
24  Senate Democrats, Schumer, Hatch Introduce Bipartisan Sports Betting Integrity 
Legislation, SENATE DEMOCRATS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.democrats.senate. 
gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-hatch-introduce-bipartisan-sports-betting-
integrity-legislation.  
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to regulate it. To this end, I am working on legislation that 
will establish clear-cut, minimum standards for sports 
betting—standards that protect consumers, deter illegal 
bookmaking, and empower states that opt against the 
legalization of sports gambling. The ultimate aim of my 
legislation is to uphold transparency, honesty and principle 
in the athletic arena.”25 
Senator Hatch also stated that, in the wake of SCOTUS’s ruling striking 
down PASPA, “I began working with stakeholders to ensure we were doing 
everything possible to protect the integrity of sports from corruption.”26 Clearly, 
the bill’s authors have focused on the bill’s overarching goal: protecting the 
integrity of organized/competitive sports. The NFL, NCAA, MLB, PGA, and 
others have voiced hearty support for the bill.27 
 
25  Orrin G. Hatch, Sports Betting Is Inevitable—Let's Make Sure It's Done Right, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 23, 2018), https://www.si.com/more-sports/2018/ 
05/23/sports-betting-senator-orrin-hatch-legislation.  
26  ESPN News Services, U.S. Senators Charles Schumer, Orrin Hatch Introduce 
Federal Sports Gambling Bill, ESPN (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.espn.com/chalk/ 
story/_/id/25573273/senators-chuck-schumer-orrin-hatch-introduce-federal-sports-
gambling-bill. 
27  See Senate Democrats, supra note 24, for support from Jocelyn Moore, National 
Football League Executive Vice President (“Rather than preventing states from 
making policy choices about whether or not to allow sports betting, the Sports 
Wagering Market Integrity Act would ensure that all state-sanctioned sports betting 
is conducted pursuant to core standards that protect consumers, guard against 
problem gambling and gambling by our nation’s youth, and uphold the integrity of 
sporting contests.”), the NCAA (“With legalized sports wagering, the NCAA’s main 
priorities are protecting student-athletes well-being and the integrity of competition. 
Because of this, we applaud the bipartisan support of Senators Hatch and Schumer 
in proposing the federal sports wagering legislation. Federal standards are needed to 
promote a safe and fair environment for the nearly half a million students who play 
college sports.”), Gordon A. Smith, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director, 
United States Tennis Association (“Based on our experience with and understanding 
of sports wagering abroad, the USTA supports a federal, holistic approach to 
regulating sports wagers, and uniform cooperation and regulation with state gaming 
regulators and betting operators, as well as robust education and regulations for 
athletes and others affiliated with these sporting events. The proposed federal sports 
wagering bill, if enacted, would significantly aid sports organizations in maintaining 
the integrity of sport. We applaud the introduction of this bill and stand ready to work 
with you to advance this important legislation.”), and Keith Whyte, Executive 
Director of the National Council on Problem Gambling (“The National Council on 
Problem Gambling thanks Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator Chuck Schumer for their 
leadership in addressing problem gambling. Using revenue from the existing sports 
wagering excise tax, this bill provides the first-ever Federal funding dedicated to 
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 It remains to be seen whether a bill akin to the Hatch-Schumer Act28 will become 
law, but given how early it is in the post-PASPA world, debating the federal 
government’s role, if any, in the regulation of sports betting is timely. To that 
end, the author’s thoughts on the matter follow. 
 
PART III 
In striking down PASPA, SCOTUS opened the door for states to authorize 
and regulate gambling. But one can argue that just because a state can do 
something doesn’t necessarily mean it should. Maybe the matter should be 
handled entirely by the federal government, given its authority to regulate 
interstate commerce.29 Or maybe the states can regulate in accordance with 
federally-imposed standards, as would be the case with the proposed Hatch-
Schumer bill. Either way, the author’s opinion is that the federal government 
should not get involved. The states can regulate intrastate sports gambling, and 
they should regulate it, free from federal involvement, for at least the following 
reasons: (1) constitutionally, states rightly have exclusive power over purely 
intrastate sports gambling; (2) states are already regulating intrastate sports 
 
gambling addiction prevention, research and treatment programs. NCPG believes 
these measures are a great first step to addressing problem gambling across the 
country. These essential programs will improve public health and wellness by 
reducing the personal, social and economic costs of gambling addiction.”); see also 
Wayne Parry, APNewsBreak: Feds eye move to regulate legal sports betting, AP 
NEWS, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://apnews.com/a3e2b43f3931436e8156f54471ad5fc3 
(“Likewise, Major League Baseball said in a statement, ‘Legalized sports betting is 
rapidly spreading across the country, creating a clear need for a set of consistent, 
nationwide integrity standards to protect the sports that millions of Americans love.’ 
The PGA Tour called for establishment of a national body to oversee the integrity of 
sports in the United States.”) (“Without continued federal guidance and oversight, 
we are very concerned that sports leagues and state governments alone will not be 
able to fully protect the integrity of sporting contests and guard against the harms 
Congress has long recognized as being associated with sports betting.”). 
28  Senators Schumer and Mitt Romney have explored the possibility of introducing 
a new version of the Hatch-Schumer Act. See Chuck Schumer, Mitt Romney Collab 
on Federal Sports Betting Legislation, SBJ DAILY (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2019/09/11/Gambling/Federal-
Legislation.aspx.  
29  “Current forms of illegal sports betting usually involve a website or an internet-
connected device, with data on scores and other statistics passing freely over state 
and international boundaries — which supports the argument that, when such betting 
becomes legal, a federal entity should be involved.” 
James Glanz, States Are Pushing to Keep Federal Regulation Out of Sports 
Gambling, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/ 
sports/sports-gambling-regulation.html. 
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gambling and are doing so effectively; and (3) federal involvement would add 
unnecessary bureaucracy and costs. 
 
A. The power to regulate intrastate sports gambling belongs to 
the states.  
 
 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” In plain terms, 
this means that states have control over anything over which the Constitution 
does not give the federal government power.30 For purposes of this article, 
notably absent from the list of the U.S. Constitution’s specifically-enumerated 
federal powers is the power to regulate intrastate sports wagering. Cato 
Institute’s Tim Lynch writes,  
 
Gambling regulation has always been considered the 
province of state and local government...The call for federal 
intervention should be resisted for several reasons. First and 
foremost, the Constitution does not authorize the federal 
government to involve itself in gambling. In the landmark 
case of Maybury vs. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall 
observed that the powers of Congress "are defined and 
limited." A cursory examination of the Constitution by any 
educated person would show that the powers of Congress are 
spelled out explicitly in Article I, section 8. The 10th 
Amendment was later added to make it clear that the powers 
not delegated to the federal government were to be "reserved 
to the states."...Federal gambling regulation would be the 
antithesis of respect for the 10th Amendment.31 
 
The power to regulate intrastate gambling simply does not belong to the 
federal government.  Rather, if it is to occur32, such regulation belongs to the 
individual states; and, indeed, gambling generally (not just sports gambling) has 
traditionally been predominantly under state (and local and tribal) control. 
 
30  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
31  Tim Lynch, Gambling Regulation Belongs to the States, CATO (July 23,1998), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/gambling-regulation-belongs-
states; Martin Derbyshire, If Congress Must Regulate Sports Betting, It Should Focus 
On Enforcement, PLAYUSA (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.playusa.com/congress-
sports-betting-enforcement/ (“It...appears to be another attempt to expand federal 
involvement in the gaming industry. If so, it tramples all over state rights and is as 
unconstitutional as the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) 
struck down in May.”). 
32  As stated in the Introduction, this article does not address whether sports gambling 
should be regulated. 
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However, one could argue that just because the states have been in charge of 
something does not mean they should have been and/or should be in the future. 
This is certainly true, but it is not a winning argument in this context. This is not 
an area in which the states have wrongly been in control. Rather, states are the 
appropriate powers. The path thus far has been perfectly in line with the 
mandates of the Constitution, which does not list gambling/wagering as an area 
reserved for the federal government.  
But again, one could counter, arguing that, though gambling is not a 
specifically-enumerated power of the federal government, the federal 
government has the Constitutional authority to regulate gambling, per its power 
to regulate interstate commerce.33 This, too, should be a losing position. 
Intrastate sports gambling, by definition, occurs entirely within the borders of a 
given state. It is not interstate in nature. Where it is legal and already occurring, 
sports wagers must be made while in the state, either while physically at the 
sports-betting venue and/or (where online sports wagering is permitted) while 
using a computer or mobile device within the state. 34  
So, to make the interstate-commerce argument, one would necessarily have 
to make the case that intrastate-sports gambling is, at least to some material 
degree, interstate in nature. Perhaps one would, for example, argue that people 
might cross a state line, in order to place a sports wager. This would be nowhere 
near sufficient to justify federal regulation per the ICC.  
According to SCOTUS, there are  
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate 
under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the 
use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, 
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’s 
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.35 
None of these three categories gives the U.S. Congress a legitimate basis for 
interstate-commerce regulation of intrastate sports gambling, and neither would 
other attempts to frame intrastate sports wagering as commercially-interstate in 
 
33  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have the Power...To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes”). 
34  See US States with Legal Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS BETTING, https://www. 
legalsportsbetting.com/states-with-legal-sports-betting/ (last updated Sept. 23, 
2020).  
35  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
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nature.  A closer examination of each of the three justifications for the federal 
government’s interstate-commerce power is in order. 
Certainly, reasonable minds can (and do) disagree regarding whether 
intrastate sports wagering is truly intrastate in nature. The author believes it is. 
Thus, if one accepts the position that intrastate sports wagering is not an 
interstate-commerce activity, it is necessarily true that there can be no channels 
of interstate commerce36, nor can there be instrumentalities, persons, or things in 
interstate commerce. Intrastate sports wagering does not entail networks of 
highways and roads, of waterways and canals, of airports and bridges, or of any 
other traditional channels of interstate commercial activity. Here, a bettor places, 
and a wagering operator accepts, a bet at a physical betting counter or via a 
website or app within the operator’s state.  
 One might argue that, since the internet—a connected network not bound to 
the borders of a given state—is being used to place and receive bets and/or since 
operators might use the internet to acquire data to aid them in setting betting 
odds, online sports wagering is interstate in nature. For example, perhaps one 
would argue that (due to the technological nature of electronic transmissions, in 
which communications sent and received in the same state can nonetheless be 
routed via another state37) a bet placed online that even monetarily enters another 
 
36  See 29 C.F.R. § 776.29 (2019).  
37  “[T]he communications systems in the U.S. have changed dramatically since 1961 
when the FWA was enacted. In 1961, the physical communications layer of the 
phone system dedicated circuits for communications connections. You may recall 
the old movies where a telephone user talks to an operator, then the operator plugs 
wires into a switchboard to connect the caller to the recipient. By 1961, many of 
these manual service exchange switches were still in use, and automated switches 
were simply an automated version of manual exchanges. Digital and touchtone 
service was not available anywhere yet. In 1961, the phone system was the 
electromechanical version of two tin cans on a string because only one conversation 
per circuit was generally accommodated. Until the use of packet switching network 
technology, the only way to increase network capacity was to lay new 
communications lines. If you analogize the old phone system to a road, it would be 
a road between origin and destination where only two cars can travel at any given 
time and the only destinations are the sending location and receiving location. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the network began to change to use internet technologies. 
Internet technologies break communications down into packets with a “to” and 
“from” address. It allows multiple discrete connections over a common physical 
layer (wire). The road analogy for the new system is like our current road system, 
where many cars may travel on the same system of roads, and many destinations may 
be reached over common roadways. Just like a real road system, congestion may 
occur when too many users try to use the same road to get to a destination. However, 
unlike the road system, the packet switched network monitors congestion and sends 
each data and voice packet from origin to destination via the least congested and 
efficient route possible based on the priority of the packet, without regard to 
geographic distance. This means communications over a packet switched network 
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state’s network makes such a bet interstate in nature, thus violating the Federal 
Wire Act38, which bars the use of an interstate or foreign wire for sports wagers 
and information assisting the placing of sports. 
 In support of this position, one would likely point to two cases holding that 
such electronic border breaching implicated interstate commerce. In United 
States v. Yaquinta39, a case involving horse wagers made via long-distance 
telephone calls made and received in West Virginia but routed through Ohio, the 
trial judge held the Wire Act was violated, writing that “the intermediate crossing 
of a State line provides enough of a peg of interstate commerce to serve as a 
resting place for the congressional hat, if that will serve the congressional 
purpose.”40 Further support for this position comes from the DOJ’s 2011 Wire 
Act guidance, which states “that the acceptance of wagers through the use of a 
wire communication facility by a gambling business…from individuals located 
either outside a state or within the borders of the state (but where transmission is 
routed outside of the state) would violate federal law.”41 Likewise, in United 
States v. Kammersell,42 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a bomb threat that originated 
in Utah but that was routed to Virginia before ending in Utah was interstate in 
nature and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)43. The court held, “A threat that 
was unquestionably transmitted over interstate telephone lines falls within the 
literal scope of the statute and gives rise to federal jurisdiction.”44  
However, a critical distinction between the activities involved in these cases 
and intrastate sports wagering conducted in states where such wagering is legal 
is that the latter involved illegal actions. It is difficult, then, to imagine that such 
 
can, and often do, cross state lines and even international boundaries.” Kate C. 
Lowenhar et al., The Potentially Catastrophic Impact of Re-interpreting the Federal 
Wire Act (Using RAWA as a Guide), NEV. GAMING L., Sept. 2018, at 46, 
https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/13-Catastrophic-Impact-of-Re-
Interpreting-Federal-Wire-Act.pdf. 
38  18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1084 (2012). 
39  United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.W. Va. 1962).  
40  Id. at 278. 
41  Mark Hichar, Even if the PASPA is Struck Down, the Wire Act Will Still Prohibit 
Sports Bets from Crossing State Lines., PUB. GAMING INT’L 40, 41 (Mar./Apr. 2018), 
http://www.publicgaming.com/PUBLICGAMINGMARCHAPRIL2018/MARKHI
CHARFINAL.pdf. Interestingly, “While the Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement 
Act (the “UIGEA”) contains an express exception for intermediate routing, the Wire 
Act contains no such exception, and the UIGEA states that “[n]o provision of [the 
UIGEA] shall be construed as altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or State 
law . . . prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.” Id. 
(citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 – 5367 and 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b)).  
42  United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 1999).  
43  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) states, “Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign 
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any 
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.”  
44  Kammersell, 196 F.3d at 1139. 
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use of the Wire Act, which was passed to fight organized crime, would extend to 
legal activities like intrastate sports betting.45 Attorney Mark Hichar writes that 
“this form of intrastate sports betting appears to be happening in Nevada without 
challenge from regulators or law enforcement, and if a court were to hold that 
the Wire Act prohibited such conduct, such would be contrary to the Wire Act’s 
stated purpose.”46 The Yaquinta court discussed the purpose of the Wire Act, 
writing,  
 
The congressional purpose here is very frankly elucidated in 
the Attorney General's letter to the branches of the Congress, 
dated April 6, 1961, in which he says, "The purpose of this 
legislation is to assist the various States * * * in the 
enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, 
bookmaking, and like offenses and to aid in the suppression 
of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use of * 
* * wire communication facilities which are or will be used 
for the transmission of certain gambling information in 
interstate * * * commerce. * * *…the objective of the Act is 
not to assist in enforcing the laws of the States through which 
the electrical impulses traversing the telephone wires pass, 
but the laws of the State where the communication is 
received.47 
 
Indeed, with regard to intrastate sports wagering made, the state where the 
wagering communication is (sent and) received is one in which such wagering is 
legal.48 
 
45  Hichar, supra note 4, at 42.  
46  Id. at 43. 
47  United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (N.D.W. Va. 1962). 
48  Hichar, supra note 41, at 43. On this point, Hichar writes, “Had the underlying 
wagering in Yaquinta been legal, it seems unlikely that the prosecution would have 
been brought, and if it had been brought, it seems unlikely that the court would have 
found the defendants guilty under the Wire Act, even if the wagering related 
information constituted actual bets and wagers (as opposed to mere information 
assisting in the placing of bets and wagers). If the underlying wagering had been 
legal in West Virginia, there would have been no need to assist the State in the 
enforcement of its laws, and using the Wire Act to prohibit communications that 
began and ended in that State, and assisted in wagering authorized by that State, 
would not have served the purpose for which the Wire Act was enacted.” “As noted 
above, the Yaquinta court determined that the out-of-state routing of 
communications beginning and ending in the same state was sufficient to consider 
the communications “in interstate or foreign commerce” for purposes of the Wire 
Act, “if that will serve the congressional purpose.” Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. at 278 
(emphasis added). If the communications at issue in Yaquinta had related to 
wagering expressly authorized by the state, then applying the Wire Act to prohibit 
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If truly interstate actions are being taken in furtherance of sports wagering, 
then the Wire Act and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 
(UIGEA)49 (which makes it unlawful “to place, receive, or otherwise knowingly 
transmit a bet or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in part, of 
the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or 
State law in the State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, 
received, or otherwise made”50) are available to the federal government; but laws 
already in place that criminalize interstate gambling should not be extended to 
purely intrastate gambling—meaning wagering in which the bet is placed and 
received in the same state—on the basis that such gambling can involve an 
electronic transmission that travels via another state’s network or on the basis of 
other feeble attempts to turn intrastate wagering into an interstate activity. The 
regulation of sports wagers placed and received in the same state squarely 
belongs with the individual states. The UIGEA itself recognizes this, carving out 
an exception for intrastate51 (and intratribal52) wagering. As for what qualifies as 
“intrastate”, the UIGEA states that “the bet or wager is initiated and received or 
otherwise made exclusively within a single State”53. Such an intrastate definition 
should not be affected solely because the least-congested route for an electronic 
communication included another state’s transmission network.  
Additionally, and regarding the third justification, intrastate sports wagering 
surely lacks the “substantial relation to interstate commerce” that SCOTUS has 
ruled can justify federal regulation of a commercial activity.54 In analyzing the 
Commerce Clause, SCOTUS held in Gibbons v. Ogden, “It is not intended to say 
that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal, which 
is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the 
 
such communications would not have served the congressional purpose, and the 
court’s statement suggests it would have decided the case differently.” Id. at 43. 
“Moreover, use of the Wire Act to prohibit intrastate wagering (except for the routing 
of transmissions) expressly authorized by a state would actually thwart that state’s 
laws, directly contrary to the stated purpose of the Wire Act. The Wire Act should 
not be used toward such ends inconsistent with its intended purpose.” Mark Hichar, 
The Wire Act Should Not be Used to Prohibit Internet Gambling Carried Out Under 





49  Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006). 
50  Id. at § 5362(10)(A) (2006). 
51  Id. at § 5362(10)(B) (2006). 
52  Id. at § 5362(10)(C) (2006). 
53  Id. at § 5362(10)(B)(i) (2006). 
54  See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (“Even activity that is purely 
intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined 
with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or 
with foreign nations.”). 
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same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power 
would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary”55. The Gibbons court went 
on to say that the federal government’s regulatory power does not extend to 
activities “which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect 
other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of 
executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely 
internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State 
itself.”56 Thus, perhaps the best route for proponents of using the Commerce 
Clause to regulate intrastate sports wagering is by attempting to show that 
intrastate sports wagering affects interstate commerce. Indeed, since Gibbons 
and beginning with its decision in Wickard v. Filburn57, SCOTUS has greatly 
expanded the reach of the Commerce Clause by ruling that certain activities that 
were seemingly intrastate in nature substantially affected interstate commerce.58 
The Wickard court stated (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 
U.S. 110, 119 (1942)), 
 
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the 
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those 
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or 
the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make 
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power 
to regulate interstate commerce. . . . The power of Congress 
over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, 
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no 
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . 
It follows that no form of state activity can constitutionally 
thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause 
to Congress. Hence, the reach of that power extends to those 
intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with 
or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.59 
 
As previously mentioned, reasonable minds can disagree, but the author 
believes intrastate sports wagering does not affect interstate commerce to such a 
degree that justifies its regulation via the Commerce Clause. Intrastate sports 
wagering seems entirely different than the types of intrastate activities SCOTUS 
has ruled substantially affect interstate commerce. For example, in Swift and 
 
55  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824). 
56  Id. at 195. 
57  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
58  See generally Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005). 
59  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. 
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Company v. U.S., SCOTUS ruled the federal government had the power to 
regulate local meat packers that acted in concert to manipulate prices in the 
country’s meat-packing industry, on the grounds that their respective local 
activities were part of the broader “stream of commerce”.60 In U.S. v. Darby, 
SCOTUS held that, regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, “Congress, 
having by the present Act adopted the policy of excluding from interstate 
commerce all goods produced for the commerce which do not conform to the 
specified labor standards, it may choose the means reasonably adapted to the 
attainment of the permitted end even though they involve control of intrastate 
activities.”61 In NLRB v. Jones, a labor-relations case involving the rights of 
workers to unionize, the Court held, “Although activities may be intrastate in 
character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be 
denied the power to exercise that control.”62  In Perez v. U.S., a case involving 
intrastate “loan sharking”, the Court ruled that Title II of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act was a valid use of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. The 
Court held, “Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the 
judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce. . . . In the setting of the present 
case there is a tie-in between local loan sharks and interstate crime.”63 In 
Gonzales v. Raich, a case involving the cultivation in California of marijuana 
intended for medicinal purposes, the Court ruled the Commerce Clause’s reach 
extends to “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of 
marijuana.”64 The Court wrote, “Thus the case for the exemption comes down to 
the claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically rather than 
sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation. Given the findings 
in the (federal Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. §801 et seq.) 
and the undisputed magnitude of the commercial market for marijuana, our 
decisions in Wickard v. Filburn and the later cases endorsing its reasoning 
foreclose that claim.”65 
By contrast, intrastate sports wagering involves private transactions 
(contracts) between bettors and sports-wagering operators within the same state. 
 
60  See Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 397-99. The Swift court held, “Here the subject-
matter is sales, and the very point of the combination is to restrain and monopolize 
commerce among the States in respect to such sales. . . . When cattle are sent for sale 
from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after 
purchase, in another, and when, in effect, they do so, with only the interruption 
necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly 
recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, 
and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.” Id. at 397. 
61  Darby, 312 U.S. at 121. 
62  Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37. 
63  See Perez, 402 U.S. at 154–55. 
64  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). 
65  Id. 
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It does not involve goods. It does not relate to employment conditions. It does 
not involve a private monopoly, price-fixing, or anything else illegal per federal 
law.  It does not interfere with any federal statutory scheme or burden or obstruct 
interstate commerce. Intrastate sports wagering is just that: intrastate sports 
wagering. Bets are placed and received in the same state. No transactions involve 
parties located in different states. Nothing about the private betting transactions 
within any state that has legalized sports wagering within that state impacts 
commerce between or among states. In short, it does not substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
As such, any efforts to reframe purely intrastate wagering as interstate 
wagering, in order to bring it within the reach of the Wire Act, the UIGEA, or 
any other current or potential federal law should be resisted. If such lines of 
reasoning are used to justify a finding of interstate commerce, then it is hard to 
imagine any activity that would be off-limits to interstate-commerce regulation, 
especially given that we live in the age of the internet.66 Further expansion of the 
federal government’s interstate-commerce powers, particularly of this 
magnitude, should not be entertained, if the Tenth Amendment is to have any 
meaning at all. The federal government should heed the first sentence of Justice 
Thomas’s Gonzales v Raich dissent: “Respondents Diane Monson and Angel 
Raich use marijuana that has never been bought or sold, that has never crossed 
state lines, and that has had no demonstrable effect on the national market for 
marijuana. If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can 
regulate virtually anything—and the Federal Government is no longer one of 
limited and enumerated powers.”67 
 
66  “[A]n interpretation that interstate commerce includes communications that may 
cross state lines while in transmission between two points within one state would 
make nearly all electronic communications subject to FWA prohibitions… The 
problem with reinterpreting the FWA to apply to all communications that do or could 
cross state lines is that all modern communications equipment - including land 
phones, cell phones, office phones, computers and tablets - ultimately use packet-
switched networks that can, and often do, cross jurisdictional boundaries, even if the 
users are not aware of the fact.” Lowenhar et al., supra note 37, at 46. 
67  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 59–69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas continued, 
“Even the majority does not argue that respondents’ conduct is itself “Commerce 
among the several States. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Ante, at 2209. Monson and Raich neither 
buy nor sell the marijuana that they consume. They cultivate their cannabis entirely 
in the State of California—it never crosses state lines, much less as part of a 
commercial transaction. Certainly, no evidence from the founding suggests that 
“commerce” included the mere possession of a good or some purely personal activity 
that did not involve trade or exchange for value. In the early days of the Republic, it 
would have been unthinkable that Congress could prohibit the local cultivation, 
possession, and consumption of marijuana. On this traditional understanding of 
“commerce,” the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., 
regulates a great deal of marijuana trafficking that is interstate and commercial in 
character. The CSA does not, however, criminalize only the interstate buying and 
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B. States are fully capable of, and best positioned for, regulating sports 
wagering and are already doing so effectively. 
 
Beyond the fact that states have the authority to regulate sports betting, states 
(and tribal nations) are equipped to do so and, in fact, are already doing so 
effectively.68 Moreover, even if there is room to improve (and, with regard to 
any endeavor, there almost always is), there is no deficiency that warrants getting 
the federal government involved. Post-PASPA, there appear to be no major 
issues or problems, thus far, in states operating legal sports wagering. And these 
states are handling a sizeable volume of sports bets. According to Legal Sports 
Report, from June 2018 through December 31, 2019, in the twelve states with 
legal sports betting, the total handle (amount wagered) was $15,780,239,725.69 
The states with the two largest handles were Nevada and New Jersey, with 
handles of $7,769,197,243 and $5,272,419,709, respectively.70 Additionally, 
although most of the states that have legalized sports wagering have done so only 
recently, Nevada has for decades effectively operated and regulated sports 
gambling. The American Gaming Association writes,  
 
In partnership with teams, leagues and regulators, gaming 
operators have successfully protected the integrity of both 
 
selling of marijuana. Instead, it bans the entire market—intrastate or interstate, 
noncommercial or commercial—for marijuana. Respondents are correct that the 
CSA exceeds Congress’ commerce power as applied to their conduct, which is purely 
intrastate and noncommercial. . . . To evade even that modest restriction on federal 
power, the majority defines economic activity in the broadest possible terms as the 
“ ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’ ” Ante, at 2211 
(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966) (hereinafter 
Webster’s 3d). This carves out a vast swath of activities that are subject to federal 
regulation. See ante, at 2224–2225 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). If the majority is to 
be taken seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes 
drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a mockery of 
Madison’s assurance to the people of New York that the “powers delegated” to the 
Federal Government are “few and defined,” while those of the States are “numerous 
and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, at 313.”   
68  This is also true of lotteries and other forms of non-sports gaming. In fact, 45 
states currently operate a lottery. Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, and Utah do not 
operate a lottery. 
69  US Sports Betting Revenue and Handle, LEGALSPORTSREPORT, https://www.legal 
sportsreport.com/sports-betting/revenue (last updated Sept. 23, 2020). This number 
is low, however, since revenue numbers are not yet available for some states. Oregon: 
“The reported data does not include tribal sports betting.” New Mexico: “Some tribal 
casinos currently feature sportsbooks. However, revenue figures from these casinos 
are not currently available.” Arkansas: “Arkansas sports betting began in July 2019. 
No revenue numbers have been reported yet.” 
70  Id.  
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bets and competitions for decades in Nevada. AGA’s 
continued position of support for state and tribal regulators 
was echoed in testimony by Nevada Gaming Control Board 
Chairwoman Becky Harris. “I don’t think that right now is 
the time for any kind of federal engagement with regard to 
gambling,” said Chairwoman Harris. “States do a great job 
in every area including sports betting and we’ve just begun 
to see the roll out in other states. Nevada has a 
comprehensive regulatory structure that has been refined 
over decades, and we have a lot of integrity in our process.”71  
 In addition to managing effectively in-person betting, states are equipped to 
regulate online and mobile wagering. In states where such wagering is 
permitted72, betting operators employ geofencing, a technology that ensures 
sports wagers are not made from bettors outside the state.73 GeoComply, the 
geofencing leader in the sports-betting industry, which “provides services to 
approved sports betting markets to ensure users remain within the allowed 
borders”74, is “an approved vendor in the states of New Jersey, Nevada, 
Delaware, Georgia, Mississippi, and West Virginia.”75 In fact, GeoComply was 
founded specifically to provide geofencing services to the online-gaming 
 
71  Press Release, Am. Gaming Ass’n, AGA to Congress: When It Comes to Sports 
Betting, States and Sovereign Tribal Nations Know Best (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.americangaming.org/new/aga-to-congress-when-it-comes-to-sports-
betting-states-and-sovereign-tribal-nations-know-best/. 
72  The Wall Street Journal reports that mobile or online sports wagering is currently 
offered in Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Katherine 
Sayre, Mobile Sports Betting Is the Moneymaker as More States Legalize, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 15:03), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mobile-sports-betting-is-the-
moneymaker-as-more-states-legalize-11567445689. According to PlayUSA.com, 
the states either offering it currently or making plans to offer it are Indiana, Iowa, 
Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Delaware, Colorado, 
Tennesee, Michigan, Virginia, Montana, Illinois, West Virginia, and Washington 
D.C. Legal US Online Gambling Guide, PLAYUSA, https://www.playusa.com/us/ 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2020). 
73  See Katherine Sayre, Mobile Sports Betting Is the Moneymaker as More States 
Legalize, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
mobile-sports-betting-is-the-moneymaker-as-more-states-legalize-11567445689 
(“Under the Supreme Court’s ruling, each state can set up its own betting system, but 
bets across state lines aren’t permitted. Mobile apps can use a method known as 
“geofencing” to keep betting action within a state’s borders.”).   
74  Sports Betting, GEOCOMPLY, https://www.geocomply.com/geocomply- 
industries/sports-betting/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).  
75  About Us, GEOCOMPLY, https://www.geocomply.com/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 
20, 2020).  
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industry.76 Indeed, such technologies appear to be effective77, experiencing high 
levels of success in ensuring that, in states where intrastate sports wagering is 
legal, all wagering comes from within the state. GeoComply, which was 
“designed to ensure that no one can place bets from out of state”78, states,  
Since launching in 2011, GeoComply has quickly become 
the iGaming industry’s trusted solution for reliable, accurate 
and precise geolocation services. GeoComply’s patented and 
proprietary geolocation solution is unparalleled in its level 
of accuracy and integrity, as well as in its depth of security 
and ease of implementation. GeoComply’s proprietary and 
highly adaptive technology has successfully met and 
exceeded all challenges put forth by North American 
regulators with record-high verification rates.79  
 
76   Brant James, Q&A with Geocomply VP Lindsay Slader On Geofencing & Future, 
BOOKIES (Dec. 13, 2019), https://bookies.com/news/q-a-with-geocomply-
vp-lindsay 
-slader-on-geofencing-future (Lindsay Slader, GeoComply’s Vice President of 
Regulatory Affairs, says, “[w]e exist solely for the purpose of providing high-caliber 
geolocation specifically for the online gaming market.”). 
77  US Sports Betting Revenue and Handle, LEGAL SPORTS Rep. (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting/revenue/ (West Virginia’s 
experience is noteworthy but not because of any technical problems. “Delaware 
 North, the only live operator, had to shut down. So too did two retail sportsbooks, 
leaving just three places to bet on sports in the state.”);  Adam Candee, Original WV 
Sports Betting Operators Might Rise From the Dead, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 23, 
2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/37230/wv-sports-betting-operators- 
relaunch/ (However, the problems there were not related to technology. “Both 
casinos halted sports betting in West Virginia back in March 2019 after less than four 
months of online wagering. The Delaware North-owned properties suffered from a 
dispute among the parent company and tech providers Miomni and EnterG. The fight 
over pricing and intellectual property led to the shutdown of the BetLucky app, as 
well as retail sportsbooks at both casinos. Lawsuits flew back and forth both in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.”).   
78  James, supra note 76. 
79  According to GeoComply, “Enhanced geolocation tools utilize both device-based 
browser geolocation and network connection analysis. This allows levels of accuracy 
of +/- 25 meters, pinpointing users to a house level, and comprehensively stopping 
spoofing via 350+ checks per transaction. Multiple databases and failover systems 
maximize pass rates to achieve 98% or more. See Download Integrated Mobile and 
Desktop SDKS, GEOCOMPLY, https://www.geocomply.com/solutions/download/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2020). When asked by Bookies.com “Is there a next generation 
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Moreover, the large volume of such wagering in states like New Jersey and 
Nevada (the two biggest sports-betting markets in the country) does not appear 
to have created any material problems. According to The Wall Street Journal,   
New Jersey sports bettors wagered a total of $3.2 billion in 
the first year, with $2.4 billion of that coming in through 
mobile phones and computers, according to state 
data...Nevada doesn’t require casinos to break out mobile-
betting revenue in their reports, but regulators estimated that 
last year about half of sports bets were online, a spokesman 
for the Nevada Gaming Control Board said.80 
That states already possess and use the technological capability to bar 
interstate wagering is strong support for the position that federal regulation is 
unnecessary.81  
 States’ (and tribes’) effective regulation of intrastate sports wagering can be 
attributed in part to a number of factors, such as the sheer amount of human and 
financial resources they devote to sports-gaming regulation and to their direct 
knowledge, and close understanding, of the gaming markets within their borders. 
According to Sara Slane, then-AGA’s senior vice president of public affairs,  
Because of the active, robust state and regulatory tribal 
gaming oversight, gaming is one of the most strictly 
regulated industries in America. Right now, over 4,000 
gaming regulators with budgets that exceed $1.3 billion 
dollars oversee the gaming industry...Just as Congress has 
 
coming where you can pinpoint someone within a couple inches?”, GeoComply’s 
Slader responded, “We already do that, too. If you think about a use case like 
Mississippi where they legislated sports betting statewide, however, the state 
constitution only allows for sports betting on premises inside their existing casino 
facilities, we had to scale down the existing system that we have and augmented it 
with hardware, put Bluetooth beacons on the walls in properties so that the minute 
that you step out the front door of the casino, you're cut off from wagering.” James, 
supra note 76.   
80  Sayre, supra note 73.  
81  Not everyone agrees. Senator Orrin Hatch writes, “As the multi-billion dollar 
gambling industry grows, so too does the likelihood that players will be exposed to 
bribes, exploitation, and other forms of corruption endemic to an environment where 
sports betting is poorly regulated. Containing this corruption is difficult, not least 
because a borderless internet makes it all but impossible to enforce state laws across 
state lines. The rise of fantasy leagues, off-shore websites, and online booking have 
made sports betting opportunities even more prevalent than ever before.” Hatch, 
supra note 25.   
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refrained from regulating lotteries, slot machines, table 
games and other gambling products, it should leave sports 
betting oversight to the states and tribes that are closest to 
the market...With such robust and rigorous regulatory 
oversight at both the state and federal levels, there is no need 
to overcomplicate or interfere with a system that is already 
working.82 
Indeed, states (and tribes) are better positioned to regulate their wagering 
markets than is the federal government. Undoubtedly, the former are much closer 
to the gambling operations within their states. Advocates of federal intervention 
regularly mention the primary goal of federal involvement: protecting the 
integrity of sports. Can states not do this? Has Nevada failed for decades at 
protecting the integrity of sports? Is there any compelling reason to believe that 
the federal government will be more effective than states and/or private entities, 
such as the Sports Wagering Integrity Monitoring Association83 and others84, at 
 
82  Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 71. 
83  About SWIMA, https://www.swima.net/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (“Established 
in November 2018, the Sports Wagering Integrity Monitoring Association (SWIMA) 
is a not-for-profit organization designed to detect and discourage fraud and other 
illegal or unethical activity related to betting on sporting events in the United States. 
SWIMA is a multi-jurisdictional entity that works in partnership with its member 
gaming operators; federal, state and tribal regulators and law enforcement; and other 
various stakeholders involved in sports wagering in the United States.”).  
84  Together, Protecting the Future of Sports, GENIUS SPORTS, https://www.genius 
sports.com/sports/integrity (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (Another of the companies 
offering sports-wagering services is Genius Sports. On the issue of protecting 
integrity, Genius Sports says, “Integrity is the lifeblood of every sport. Match-fixing 
and betting-related corruption pose the most significant threat to the integrity of your 
sport. Your relationships with your fans, commercial strength, and ability to rule 
independently all rely on your competitions being fair, transparent and unpredictable. 
Combining round-the-clock bet monitoring, educational services, integrity audits, 
and over a decade’s experience, we’ll work alongside you to provide the greatest 
level of protection… Our Bet Monitoring System leads the fight against match-fixing 
with predictive algorithms that flag potentially suspicious betting activity.” Andy 
Levinson, Senior Vice President of Tournament Administration for the PGA, says, 
“Genius Sports plays a pivotal role in supporting our Integrity Program. Not only 
have they helped to inform our existing rules and regulations but their monitoring 
system provides us with round-the-clock surveillance and protection.”). Another 
company in this space is Sportradar Integrity Services, “a non-profit unit within the 
Sportradar group and the world’s leading supplier of sports integrity solutions for 
sports governing bodies, anti-doping organisations, clubs, state authorities, law 
enforcement agencies as well as private organisations to support them in the fight 
against betting-related match-fixing, doping and other integrity threats.” About Us, 
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warding off corruption and other ills in the sports-gambling industry?85 The 
author contends there is not. States are already actively pursuing the goal of 
integrity within their sports-wagering industries. For example, the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board writes,  
The primary purpose of the Board is to protect the stability 
of the gaming industry through investigations, licensing, and 
enforcement of laws and regulations; to ensure the collection 
of gaming taxes and fees an essential source of state revenue; 
and to maintain public confidence in gaming... Our agency’s 
reputation has been built around a philosophy of consistent 
legal, ethical and fair-minded practices and actions. Our 
reputation has also been established through highly rigorous 
standards for licensing, suitability and operation...We 
protect the integrity and stability of the industry through our 
investigative and licensing practices, and we enforce laws 
 
SPORTRADAR, https://integrity.sportradar.com/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020); 
(Says the company, “Through our unique Fraud Detection System (FDS), and other 
advanced Monitoring & Detection services, we monitor the entire global betting 
market and detect betting-related fraud in sport. Our Intelligence & 
Investigation services offer support for our integrity partners’ match-fixing 
investigations and intelligence management. Our customised Education & 
Prevention services and tools help our partners tackle and prevent match-fixing… 
We provide background checks and detailed reporting on both organisations and 
individuals to help sports governing bodies, clubs, anti-doping organisations, law 
enforcement agencies, private organisations as well as bookmakers and casinos make 
high-stakes decisions by finding weak spots, potential issues and threats to their sport 
and business. …Our Integrity Services team, currently distributed across 15 different 
locations around the world, relies on the close cooperation and expertise of over 100 
dedicated full-time employees. By identifying strong talent from a variety of 
backgrounds in areas such as operations, betting analysis, anti-doping, intelligence, 
investigation, development, IT, education, sales, design, marketing and management, 
we have developed a unique pedigree and understanding of the global match-fixing 
and doping phenomenons.”). 
85  Hillary Russ, First Sports Betting Integrity Group Launched in United States, 
REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/usa-gambling-sports/first-
sports-betting-integrity-group-launched-in-united-states-idUKL2N1Y21I6 
(“Sportsbooks, leagues and regulators already do their own fraud monitoring, 
looking for odd betting patterns, abnormalities, insider activity and other suspicious 
data.”).  
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and regulations, while holding gaming licensees to high 
standards.86  
 Finally, in support of the position that the individual states are best 
positioned to regulate sports wagering, it is also worth noting that most states 
already regulate non-sports gaming options. For example, forty-five states87 
currently operate state lotteries. Clearly, then, states are no strangers to gaming 
regulation. They have been doing it for years—some for decades—and their 
track records do not reveal any compelling reason not to trust them to continue 
to regulate gaming of all types, free from federal involvement.  
C. Federal involvement adds unnecessary bureaucratic requirements 
and costs. 
 
 A third reason to argue against federal involvement in intrastate sports 
gambling is that it would add an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and an 
unnecessary layer of costs to the regulation of sports wagering. As explored 
above, states are empowered to regulate, are fully capable of regulating, and are 
already effectively regulating intrastate sports gambling. Especially considering 
state operators are technologically able to ensure sports wagering in their 
respective states stays entirely within the borders of their states, there is simply 
no need for the federal government to become involved. Moreover, it is 
undeniable that adding more rules from another regulatory authority, particularly 
the federal government, would impose additional costs on all market participants.  
For example, several of the Hatch-Schumer Act’s many provisions88 are 
worth noting for the time and/or money that will be required, in order for states 
 
86  About Us, NEV. GAMING CONTROL BD. GAMING COMM’N, https://gaming.nv.gov/ 
index.aspx?page=2 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).  
87  Lotteries in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Lotteries_in_the_United_States#States_with_no_lotteries (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
Washington, D.C., the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico also operate lotteries. 
88  Schumer, Hatch Introduce Bipartisan Sports Betting Integrity Legislation, 
SENATE DEMOCRATS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/news 
room/press-releases/schumer-hatch-introduce-bipartisan-sports-betting-integrity-
legislation (“Prohibit the acceptance of sports wagers, with exceptions for social 
gambling and states that meet certain minimum standards; Permit states to authorize 
online sports wagering to provide a regulated alternative to the illegal, offshore 
market; Prohibit sports wagers on amateur sporting events except the Olympics and 
college sports; Establish to request restrict certain sports wagers when necessary to 
protect contest integrity; Prohibit sports wagering by individuals younger than 21; 
athletes, coaches, officials, and others associated with sports organizations; and 
individuals convicted of certain federal crimes related to sports wagering; Require 
that sports wagering operators use data provided or licensed by sports organizations 
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to comply with them. According to a draft of the Act circulated by Senator 
Hatch’s office, in order to set up a sports-wagering operation, a state would have 
to receive approval from the U.S. Attorney General.89 Secondly, through 2022, 
operators would be required to use data only from the relevant sports leagues or 
sources authorized by the relevant sports leagues, when determining the outcome 
of sports wagers.90 Thirdly, operators would be obligated to furnish certain 
information in real-time (or soon thereafter) to the National Sports Wagering 
Clearinghouse91, “the entity designated by the Attorney General under section 
106(b).”92 Information that would be required to be disclosed would include 
certain wager-transaction data93, as well as information regarding suspicious 
 
to determine the outcome of sports wagers through 2024, and set requirements for 
data used thereafter; Establish a national self-exclusion list; Put in place a variety of 
consumer protections, including disclosure, advertising, and reserve requirements; 
Establish recordkeeping and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; Update 
existing casino anti-money laundering laws to include sports wagering operators; 
Provide a process whereby states may compact with each other to permits (sic) 
interstate sports wagering; Create a National Sports Wagering Clearinghouse that 
would be responsible for analyzing sports wagering data to identify patterns or trends 
of illegal activity. Additionally, this Clearinghouse would receive and share 
anonymized sports wagering data and suspicious transaction reports among sports 
wagering operators, state regulators, sports organizations, and federal and state law 
enforcement;  Dedicate revenue from the existing sports wagering excise tax to law 
enforcement and programs for the prevention and treatment of gambling disorder; 
Update the Wire Act to permit certain interstate sports wagers, while also providing 
additional enforcement authorities such as a state cause of action and a new 
mechanism for the Department of Justice to target unlicensed, offshore sports 
wagering websites; Expand the Sports Bribery Act to cover extortion and blackmail, 
prohibit sports wagers based on nonpublic information, and strengthen whistleblower 
protections; and Provide additional authorities to the Department of Health and 
Human Services to prevent, monitor, and treat gambling addiction.).  
89  § 102(b), Sports Betting Discussion Draft, Office of Senator Orrin Hatch, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Sports-Betting-
Discussion-Draft.pdf.  
90  Id. § 103(5)(A)(i). After 2022, operators may use data solely from sources 
approved by their respective state regulatory authority. See id. at § 103(5)(A)(ii). 
91  Id. § 106. 
92  Id. § 3(8).  
93  Id. § 103(b)(12). For each wager, the operator would be required to report “in real-
time or as soon as practicable, but not later than 24 hours after the time at which a 
sports wager is accepted by the sports wagering operator” the following data: “(i) a 
unique identifier for the transaction and, if available, the individual who placed the 
sports wager, except that such identifier shall not include any personally identifiable 
information of such individual; (ii) the amount and type of sports wager; (iii) the date 
and time at which the sports wager was accepted; (iv) the location at which the sports 
wager was placed, including the internet protocol address, if applicable; and (v) the 
outcome of the sports wager;” Id. § 103(b)(12)(B). 
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transactions94. Fourthly, operators would be subject to numerous requirements 
relating to recordkeeping95, advertising96, consumer protection97, and other areas. 
Each of these adds costs for operators.   
Perhaps most worrisome to state operators is the possibility that the federal 
government might impose a so-called “integrity fee”, which is, in essence, an 
off-the-top tax on all sports wagers (a.k.a. the “handle”) that is paid to 
professional sports leagues. Since a sports-wagering operator’s handle is a pre-
tax amount, the integrity fee would reduce the amount of taxes states make on 
sports wagering. It’s possible states would respond to this reduced tax revenue 
by increasing the fees they charges operators. Furthermore, integrity fees would 
drastically reduce the amount of revenue for operators.98 As with any business, 
operators might then pass on their higher costs to consumers99, especially 
considering how tight the margins already are for operators, who have to pay (in 
addition to all of their internal/operational costs) state taxes and a federal excise 
tax of 0.25 percent of handle.   
 
94  Id. § 103(b)(13)(B); These reports would also be required to be submitted to the 
relevant state’s regulatory authority. Id. at § 103(b)(13)(A). 
95  Id. § 103(b)(10). 
96  Id. § 103(b)(7). 
97  Id. § 103(b)(6). 
98  Sports Betting Integrity Fee, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport. 
com/integrity-fee/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (“An integrity fee, as proposed, would 
tax handle at a rate of 1%, payable to each league on which sports wagering would 
occur. Leagues later slashed that ask to 0.25%. Some who are new to the sports 
betting industry confuse handle for revenue: Handle is the total amount wagered by 
bettors, so it’s a gauge of how much money is flowing through sportsbooks. Revenue, 
on the other hand, is how much sportsbooks hold from the total amount wagered. 
Historically, this number comes in at about 5% of handle for sportsbook operators. 
An integrity fee, then, would send a set amount of wagers from sportsbooks to the 
leagues, regardless of the revenue picture of the sportsbook. Using a 1% fee and a 
5% hold, a one percent integrity fee would equate to roughly 20% of revenue going 
to the leagues. The fees have no requirements for the leagues attached to them. It’s 
just a transfer of money from gaming operators to the leagues.”).  
99  Darren Heitner, NBA Asks For 1% Integrity Fee From Sports Betting Operators, 
FORBES (Jan. 25, 2018, 7:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/ 
2018/01/25/nba-asks-for-1-integrity-fee-from-sports-betting-operators/#366d017d 
643a (Forbes reports that the American Gaming Association “disagrees that the 1% 
"integrity fee" is necessary or justified, and takes the position that it is merely a 
proposal that skims money from American taxpayers...The AGA notes that a legal 
Nevada sports book realizes only 3.5% to 5% in revenue and that a 1% "integrity 
fee" on all money wagered legally would amount to 20% to 29% of that total 
revenue.”); Sports Betting Integrity Fee, LINES (May 24, 2018), https://www.thel 
ines.com/betting/integrity-fee/ (“And naturally, if the sportsbooks start to get 
squeezed, the customer is next in-line. An even tighter profit margin is sure to result 
in: Prices on straight bets going up.”).  
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More problematic fundamentally, an integrity fee would transfer a huge 
amount of money to parties that are not involved in sports wagers.100 Legal 
Sports Report writes, “Yes, the leagues ’contests are the basis for betting. But 
the leagues are playing no functional role in the industry. The state will be 
regulating it. The sportsbooks are operating it. The leagues simply exist.” 101As 
in any legal transaction, there are already three parties in every legal sports 
wager: the seller (sports-wagering operator), the buyer (the bettor), and the 
government. An integrity fee adds, and would significantly enrich, an 
unnecessary fourth party.  
Thus far, no state that has legalized intrastate sports wagering has mandated 
an integrity fee. And, of course, why would they? This would simply reduce their 
tax revenue. The NBA and MLB are leading proponents of such a fee.102 The 
NBA says these fees are necessary.  
 
NBA spokesman Mike Bass justifies the fee by referencing 
the risk the league is and will be taking as it supports a 
change in the current law that limits full-fledged sports 
betting to taking place within Nevada's borders. “Sports 
 
100  John Holden, Integrity Fee Issues For NBA And MLB Run Deeper Than They 
Appear, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 24, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/ 
32378/holden-nba-mlb-integrity-fee/ (Among other problems, this could create anti-
trust problems for professional sports leagues. Legal Sports Report writes, “Marc 
Edelman, a professor of law at Baruch College and expert on antitrust regulations 
and their application to sport, said: “'As a general matter, a company may choose to 
do business or not do business for any reason. What makes the leagues distinct is that 
they have a monopoly in their sports.’ Edelman noted that while sports leagues have 
monopolies amongst their own sport, when they seek to leverage that monopoly into 
another market they may run afoul of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which 
can be a felony with fines up to $100 million for corporate offenders. Edelman 
cautioned: 'It would be very early in the process to draw any presumption that there 
is an antitrust violation, but these allegations would have to be looked at very closely 
from a collusion perspective under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and from 
the perspective of attempting to create a monopoly in a new market, under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.’”).  
101  Sports Betting Integrity Fee, supra note 98. 
102  Id. (“Integrity fees, as they’ve been advanced in some states, are basically taxes 
on legal sports betting. They’ve been popularized by the NBA and Major League 
Baseball as they look to find a way to profit from the proliferation of sports betting 
in the US. The fee would transfer money from sportsbooks to sports governing bodies 
themselves. Leagues first proposed the fees in Indiana in 2018. Then the NBA 
adopted them as its preferred policy around the country during a hearing in New 
York. NBA and MLB are actively opposing legislation that does not include an 
integrity fee. It’s not an entirely new idea. For instance, pro leagues in both France 
and Australia already get a small percentage of wagers made in those jurisdictions. 
Curiously, they may have been introduced in the US by New Jersey lawmakers as a 
way to smooth the legal confrontation”);  See also Heitner, supra note 99. 
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leagues provide the foundation for sports betting while 
bearing the risks it imposes, even when regulated,” says 
Bass. "If sports betting is legalized federally or state by state, 
we will need to invest more in compliance and enforcement, 
and believe it is reasonable for operators to pay each league 
1% of the total amount bet on its games to help compensate 
for the risk and expense created and the commercial value 
our product provides them. This is a similar approach to 
legally-regulated sports betting in other international 
jurisdictions."103 
 
The Lines reports,  
 
The leagues have argued from the onset — the provision first 
made an appearance in a proposed Indiana sports betting bill 
in January — that the funds would go toward a 
comprehensive monitoring system that would ensure the 
outcomes of games played under their banner were free of 
any undue influence from sports betting. Moreover, some 
pesky questioning by Connecticut lawmakers recently got 
NBA VP and general counsel Dan Spillane to concede that 
the fee also represented an “intellectual property right” – aka 
royalty – paid to the leagues for the right to have their games 
wagered on.104 
But since an integrity fee is simply a transfer of money to sports leagues, it 
comes as no surprise that professional sports leagues favor and lobby for federal 
intervention. Sports leagues may claim they need the money, in order to protect 
the integrity of their respective sports, but these leagues have made it this far 
without such payments and, as noted above, multiple other public and private 
parties are already working to advance the goal of integrity in sports. 
 
103  See Matt Bonesteel, Sports Gambling ‘Integrity Fee’ Supporters Are Not Doing 
Themselves Any Favors, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/early-lead/wp/2018/05/22/sports-gambling-integrity-fee-supporters-are-
not-doing-themselves-any-favors/ (“The NBA, in particular, seems to think it should 
get a cut of the money gambled on pro basketball games because of 'the risk and 
expense created by betting and the commercial value our product creates for betting 
operators,’ as Dan Spillane, the NBA’s senior vice president and assistant general 
counsel, told a New York state Senate committee in January, when it discussed 
whether to allow sports gambling should the Supreme Court rule favorably. The 
money generated from such fees — 1 percent of the total amount bet on games — 
would be used for bet monitoring and investigations along with education, Spillane 
said.”). 
104  Sports Betting Integrity Fee, supra note 99. 
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As such, it is not surprising that states and sports books have largely objected 
to the idea of an integrity fee105, so much so that sports leagues subsequently 
rebranded, in effect, the idea in the form of a mandate for sports books to pay to 
use official league data.106 Whatever the name, some see this as simply a money-
grab attempt by the leagues. Martin Derbyshire writes, “It smells likes (sic) its 
(sic) just another attempt to force operators to use official league data and create 
some kind of a national sports wagering clearinghouse. If so, it’s simply a cash 
grab aimed at making sure pro sports leagues and the feds get a piece of the sports 
betting pie.”107  
 
105  Sports Betting Integrity Fee, supra note 99 (Integrity fees “are widely considered 
a non-starter by many in the gaming industry, considering that prospective 
sportsbook operators will also have to fork over...Veteran sportsbook operators and 
bookmakers rightly point out the water is already about chest-high when it comes to 
them squeaking out an appreciable annual profit. That’s without gift-wrapping 
millions to the leagues each year under the aforementioned 1 percent rate.”); Holden, 
supra note 100 (“When asked about William Hill’s position on these purported fees, 
CEO Joe Asher said, ‘It’s no secret we are firmly opposed to any sort of integrity 
fee.’ Indeed, Asher flagged a potentially related issue in July 2018, noting that the 
effect of consolidation of data utilizing exclusive providers would be leagues being 
able to charge whatever price for data they want. The situation is that the NBA and 
MLB have demanded Nevada books pay 0.25 percent of handle to the leagues in 
exchange for official league data...Robert Walker, of US Bookmaking, said that his 
company was not affected by these demands: If it is indeed true, I am not surprised. 
The leagues are doing whatever they can do to get a fee. I feel this agreement is 
between the leagues and the data providers only. The books should not have to pay 
an additional fee than what was otherwise agreed upon. If the fees are raised 
eventually due to the leagues demand than a sports book will have to decide if a data 
fee vendor change makes sense.”); See generally Maury Brown, MLB's Gamble On 
Integrity Fees And Its Official Data Stream Getting Pushback From Gaming 
Operators, FORBES (May 7, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maury 
brown/2019/05/07/mlbs-gamble-on-integrity-fees-and-its-official-data-stream-
getting-pushback-from-gaming-operators/#3ff5bd0b8014); See also Bonesteel, 
supra note 103 (“But the proposed fees have been met with skepticism from just 
about everyone else.”).  
106  Holden, supra note 100  (“The concept of an integrity fee paid to sports leagues 
by states legalizing sports betting flopped so resoundingly that it had to be renamed. 
League officials stopped referring to an integrity fee and started calling it a royalty. 
By any name, a cut of legal sports betting handle stood as the goal, along with profit 
from the sale of so-called official league data.”).  
107  Martin Derbyshire, If Congress Must Regulate Sports Betting, it Should Focus 
on Enforcement, PLAYUSA (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.playusa.com/congress-
sports-betting-enforcement/; See also AGA Opposes Federal Government Overreach 
 on Sports Betting, AM. GAMING ASS’N. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.american 
gaming.org/new/aga-opposes-federal-government-overreach-on-sports-betting/ 
(“Additional areas this bill seeks to address – including the mandatory use of official 
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Finally, it is worth noting that, whether in the form of an integrity fee or a 
royalty fee or due to any of the proposed provisions in the Hatch-Schumer Act 
that will increase operators’ expenses, raising the cost of sports wagering could 
lead more consumers to place bets in unregulated local and offshore markets, 
which would cut directly against the goal of ensuring that U.S. sports wagering 
takes place in regulated U.S. markets.108 Regarding the Hatch-Schumer Act, U.S. 
Representative Fina Titus (Nevada) stated,  
 
This bill undermines Nevada’s expertise and experience in 
establishing a successful, regulated sports betting market. It 
would inject uncertainty into an established and regulated 
industry, weaken Nevada’s ability to promptly adapt to 
maintain its gold standard, and risk causing bettors and 




 Now that states are free to legalize intrastate sports wagering, the market for 
sports betting in the U.S. will continue to grow; and the burgeoning markets that 
are being created necessarily lead to debates about how best to regulate such 
markets, for the good of all market participants. Many have called for an 
expanded for the federal government in such regulation, but such calls are 
unwarranted.  
States, not the federal government, have the Constitutional authority to 
regulate intrastate sports gambling. And arguments that (particularly 
online/mobile) intrastate wagering has enough of an interstate connection to 
justify federal regulation via the Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause 
should be rejected, for such an interpretation would exponentially increase the 
number of activities (namely, electronic communications) subject to the ICC, 
thus effectively gutting our nation’s system of federalism, as established by the 
Tenth Amendment.  
 
league data and the creation of a national sports wagering clearinghouse – can, and 
should, be decided by marketplace negotiations between private businesses and 
cooperative agreements among jurisdictions. In the mere six months since the U.S. 
Supreme Court paved the way for legal, regulated sports betting, significant 
developments on both of these fronts have already occurred without any federal 
involvement.”).  
108  Sports Betting Integrity Fee, supra note 99 (“And naturally, if the sportsbooks 
start to get squeezed, the customer is next in line. An even tighter profit margin is 
sure to result in...Consumers consequently still seeking out offshore sports betting 
websites and local bookmakers, i.e. the black market legalized sports betting is 
supposed to eradicate.”).  
109  Adam Candee, Hatch, Schumer Preparing to Drop Federal Sports Betting Bill 
In Senate, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/ 
26901/federal-sports-betting-bill-drop/.  
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Moreover, states are already regulating intrastate sports gambling and are 
doing so effectively. States that have legalized sports gambling are devoting 
large amount of human and financial resources toward effective regulation of the 
sports wagering within their respective borders. And sports teams, sports-
wagering operators, and others are availing themselves of sports-wagering 
services developed and offered by private companies, such as integrity-related 
services like fraud monitoring.  
Finally, federal involvement would add unnecessary bureaucracy and costs 
that could distort markets and, ultimately, burden consumers, who might instead 
choose to place their bets in unregulated local and offshore betting markets. 
Proponents of an expanded regulatory role for the federal government have 
primarily touted the goal of integrity, but actions that could ultimately send more 
bettors away from regulated state markets to unregulated markets would work 
directly against such a goal. Such actions should be avoided, particularly given 
that, as noted above, they are unnecessary. 
As such, the federal government should stay on the sidelines and let the 
individual states monitor and control the sports wagering that takes place entirely 
within their borders.  
 
